Why do so many speculators enter financial markets when most lose money and cease trading after a short period of time? In contrast to existing behavioral explanations, we offer an equilibrium model of learning by rational agents that explains these and related phenomena. Agents do not know their speculative skills, but trading profits can provide them information. Even though it is common knowledge that most traders are unskilled, some agents enter financial markets. They initially experiment by trading on a small scale, and use the information uncovered by their trading profits to decide whether to continue. Competitive market makers post price quotes, recognizing the entry process of speculators, so that the rewards from speculation are endogenous. The model reconciles several empirical regularities: (1) In a given cross-section, most individual speculators lose money. We also show how learning from trade produces endogenous liquidity in financial markets. This endogenous liquidity reduces bid-ask spreads and reduces the effect of exogenous liquidity shocks on asset prices, but amplifies the effect of real shocks in the economy (e.g., labor market and learning costs) on prices. Finally, if some traders are slightly overconfident about their speculative abilities, we show that this increases bid-ask spreads, thereby hurting all traders.
What motivates new traders to continually enter [financial] markets? A sophisticated investment strategy that results in persistent losses in one financial market? An irrational belief that they possess superior skill? The desire to gamble on their beliefs and the consumption they derive from the activity? These are important questions, the answers to which will provide insight into the overall performance of futures markets. (Hartzmark 1991, p. 73) Individual speculators in financial markets account for a large share of total market activity.
Yet, studies over different financial markets and time periods find that most speculators make net trading losses after commissions (see Steward (1949) , Ross (1973 Ross ( , 1975 , Hieronymus (1977) in futures markets, and Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2004) in stock markets.) A central question is:
Why do investors engage in such apparent wealth-destructive activities?
Researchers have suggested behavioral and psychological explanations. Hieronymus (1977) , Teweles and Jones (1987) and Hartzmark (1991) propose risk-loving, or utility from gambling-type activities, but Barber et al. (2004) find that losses are too large to be reconciled solely by riskseeking. Other researchers argue that traders mistakenly believe they can forecast prices, and tend to remember profits, but forget losses (Teweles and Jones 1987) , or argue that investors may be overconfident about their trading acumen (see Barber et al. (2004) , and references therein.) This paper proposes a rational, learning-based explanation. Rather than approach this empirical puzzle as an isolated fact, we form a more complete picture by incorporating related findings. First, trading intensities are positively correlated with subsequent performance: More active speculators out-perform less active speculators (Ross (1973 (Ross ( , 1975 , Hieronymus (1977) , Hartzmark (1987 Hartzmark ( , 1991 , Barber et al. (2004) ). Second, there is a strong relation between speculators' performance and their subsequent trade intensity: Better past performers tend to increase trade intensities by more than average, while worse past performers sharply curtail theirs (Barber et al. 2004 ). In fact, most new traders trade on a small scale, lose money (Hieronymus (1977) , Ross (1973 Ross ( , 1975 ), and quickly cease speculation (Ross (1973 (Ross ( , 1975 ). Finally, there is a strong positive relation between past and future performance. In particular, the most profitable speculators continue to earn positive profits after accounting for commissions (Barber et al. 2004 ).
Taken together, these observations highlight a flow of novice traders in and out of the financial speculation profession. Some of each cohort continue trading successfully, and in fact their trade intensities and profits rise with time, but most cease speculation following disappointing results. We develop an equilibrium, rational, learning-based model in which these predictions feature centrally.
In our overlapping generations environment, individuals do not know their speculative abilities, but they can trade, which provides them information about their trading skills. Only a small fraction of the population is adept at identifying profitable trading opportunities. In equilibrium, some individuals enter financial markets. Recognizing that most traders lack financial acumen, novice speculators first experiment on a small scale. They then use the information contained in their trading profits to decide whether to continue. Those who earn sufficient profits conclude that they are likely to be skilled and expand their speculative activities. However, most speculators do less well, conclude that they are more likely to be inept traders and leave the financial market. In our equilibrium model, competitive market makers post price quotes, recognizing the entry process of speculators, so that the rewards from speculation are endogenously determined. Our equilibrium model of agent learning and rational experimentation reconciles each of the following empirical regularities:
1. In a given cross-section, most individual speculators lose money.
2. On average, large (more active) speculators outperfrom small (less active) speculators.
3. Performance positively affects subsequent trade intensity. Most new traders start on a small scale, perform poorly and cease speculation, but the few better performers continue to speculate and expand their trade. Past performance is also correlated with future performance.
It seems to us that learning must be central to any full explanation of these facts: Behavioral explanations alone are insufficient. For example, risk-loving alone cannot generate the quick exit of most agents (with poor performance). Selective recall cannot reconcile exit of poor performers and expansion of trade by better performers. The persistence in performance indicates that agents differ in ability, and the response of trading scale to past performance indicates learning about ability that cannot be reconciled solely by overconfidence. We do not dismiss overconfidence as part of an explanation, but we show that a simple rational learning story suffices to reconcile all of these facts.
Interestingly, we also prove that all speculators are made worse off if some speculators are overconfident, provided that they are not too over-confident. One's intuition might be that the presence of irrationally overconfident speculators would narrow bid-ask spreads. But this intuition is valid only if agents are sufficiently overconfident. Overconfident speculators trade more than is optimal.
If they are only slightly overconfident, their expected marginal trading profits on their "excessive trades" are close to the opportunity costs of the value of their work time foregone, implying that they expect to make money on their excessive trading, just not enough to cover their opportunity costs. In turn, market makers post wider quotes, which hurts all traders.
In our model, most inexperienced speculators, while learning about their abilities, trade on contentless information. In this way, learning-from-trade provides an additional, endogenous, source of liquidity to financial markets: Learning-from-trade significantly reduces equilibrium bid-ask spreads. This phenomenon has been documented in empirical research. For example, Canoles, Thompson, Irwin and France (1998) claim that small-scale futures speculators are a significant source of liquidity. This endogenous liquidity trade reduces the impact of exogenous liquidity shocks on asset prices, but amplifies the impact of real shocks (in the labor market or in costs of learning) on asset prices. The endogenous liquidity can also induce common liquidity movements across assets. This hints at a connection between our model and the literature on "commonality in liquidity" ( Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001) , and studies on aggregate liquidity as a priced factor ( Pastor and Stambaugh 2002) .
Our model thus lays a rational foundation for the presence of agents traditionally identified as "noise traders" in financial markets, and shows that their participation as a group is persistent.
It is also related to the intuition of Black (1986) that noise traders may simply confuse the noise they trade on with information. Based on this intuition, Wang (2002) , and Kanatas and Wang (2003) develop models that feature noise traders who mistakenly believe the contentless signals they receive contain information, and show their effect on financial markets. In contrast, agents in our model are rational and "noise trading" is the outcome of a rational learning process.
Bayesian learning has its foundation in the statistical decision theory literature from the 1960s (e.g., Raifa and Schlaifer 1961) . Our model corresponds to a bandit problem in which payoffs are endogenously determined through the equilibrium bid and ask prices. Bandit models with endogenous prizes have been considered in oligopoly contexts by Bergemann and Valimaki (1996, 1999) .
The idea of learning as a selection mechanism dates back at least to Jovanovich (1982) , who studies the evolution of an industry and uses a noisy selection mechanism to explain why smaller firms grow faster and are more likely to fail than larger firms. Researchers have also sought to explain asset pricing anomalies with learning (e.g., Veronesi (1999 Veronesi ( , 2000 , Pastor and Veronesi (2003b) ). Pastor and Veronesi (2003a) offer a model of stock valuation with Bayesian learning that produces IPO waves and related phenomena. We have not found, however, rigorous models of any kind that explain entry, exit, and performance of speculators in financial markets.
While our research is motivated by observations from public speculators' survival time and their overall performance in financial markets, it has implications for related phenomena. Each year, large financial firms hire new finance graduates. The new hires trade on a small, "testing" scale. Based on their performance, most of them are fired. The survivors trade on a larger scale and show better performance on average. Another example is the entry and exit of financial analysts.
Evidence indicates that most analysts are active for a short time span, leaving the profession soon after their entry. Average performance of the survivors, in terms of the forecast precision, is better.
We next detail the model. Section 2 develops the equilibrium conditions and provide an existence theorem. Section 3 first characterizes the properties of the unique equilibrium, and then shows that the model can closely match the quantitative features of the data and investigates the qualitative impacts of learning on financial markets. Section 4 concludes with a summary and directions for further research. Appendix A summarizes key empirical studies. Appendix B provides proofs of results.
The Model
We consider a stochastic overlapping-generations environment over t = . . . , −1, 0, 1, . . . . Each period, a continuum of measure one of two-period-lived potential speculators (agents) are born.
Agents are risk-neutral with a common discount factor of one, and are not wealth constrained.
Each period, agents have one unit of time that they allocate between work and financial speculation. There is an alternative occupation that pays w per unit of time. An agent who speculates must spend time gathering financial information, time not spent working at the alternative occupation.
Assets. There are N assets in the economy, where N is a large number. Asset values are publicly revealed at the end of each period, and have two components:
where Z γ,t =    z with probability 1 2 −z with probability
Here V γ,t is the value of asset γ at the end of period t, v γ,t is public information at the beginning of period t, and Z γ,t is an innovation about which speculators can acquire signals. We assume Z γ,t is independently distributed from all other innovations. This assumption is made for simplicity and not realism, but it does not affect our key theoretical predictions. 1
Speculators. A speculator incurs a time cost τ 0 > 0 just to immerse herself in the financial market.
In addition, it takes time τ > 0 to acquire a signal about an asset's value. Signals are either based on intrinsic information about asset values-in which case the agent is a skilled speculator-or the signals are contentless-in which case the agent is an unskilled speculator. Agents differ only in their abilities to acquire and process information. One interpretation of a skilled speculator is that she is better at uncovering "fundamental" values. The interpretation that we prefer is that able speculators are "technical" traders with a knack for identifying short-term mispricing of assets.
More specifically, a speculator α who investigates asset γ, obtains a signal α γ,t ∈ {−z, z} related to the end-of-period asset value, where
An able agent can process financial information to acquire informative signals that are positively correlated with asset values:
2 . An unskilled agent produces uninformative signals, uncorrelated with asset values: θ α = 1 2 . Thus, θ α quantifies agent α's skills in gathering and analyzing financial data. Given the realization of an agent's type, θ α , her signals are assumed to be independent (across assets that are investigated). 2 An agent's trading skill-her ability to process 1 In future work, we hope to relax this assumption to derive additional cross-section and time-series predictions. 2 Our analysis extends almost immediately if we relax the assumption that signals are conditionally independent given a speculator's type-so that correlation could arise due to the speculator's common model of asset values, as long as we maintain the assumption of independence across traders, which preserves our stationary structure.
financial data-does not vary over her lifetime. Agents do not know their types, but they are born with a prior probability of being skillful. We identify each young agent with her prior probability ρ of skillfulness and let F denote the distribution over ρ in the population of young agents. We assume that F has full support on [0, 1] .
A prototypical example of a novice speculator in our model is a Japanese hairdresser, as described by a Barney Jopson article in the Financial Post, September 15, 2004: "Kiyoshi Wakino, day trades in between doing haircuts for 5-6 people in a day ... times his buys using charting software, cashes in profits once gains reach 10%, while cutting losses after 2%-3% falls." Mr. Wakino has a clear opportunity (time) cost to his trading, and while earning a twenty five percent annual return on his trades to date, still is uncertain whether he is an able speculator.
Trade game. A speculator can submit either a buy or a sell order for one round lot for each asset that she chooses to trade. Focusing on round lot orders eases the analysis. In addition to the trades from young and old agents, a market maker receives round lot orders from liquidity traders. The distribution of buy and sell liquidity orders is the same across assets, and their expected measure (per asset) is µ N . One can interpret µ N as the probability that a liquidity shock hits an agent and forces her to trade (buy or sell) a specific asset γ for exogenous reasons. Financial markets are cleared by competitive, risk-neutral market makers who maximize their expected profits. Market makers announce bid and ask prices in the beginning of period t and execute all orders at the corresponding prices.
At the end of each period, traders close positions at the (then) known value of assets and realize profits and losses. Agents use Bayes rule to update beliefs about their financial acumen from their trading performance. We assume that agents must trade to "realize" prices and learn whether they are able. That is, paper trading is of limited benefit because it is difficult to ascertain the precise prices at which orders are executed. This is especially important for day traders who seek to exploit temporary mispricing. Indeed, one can interpret the distribution over priors as reflecting pre-trade learning in the economy due to paper trading, which raises diversity of beliefs across agents. Such changes, as long as they are small, do not change the qualitative features of the equilibrium.
Timing. The timing of actions each period is as follows:
1. Each agent allocates her time to work and speculation.
2. Each agent chooses the subset of assets for which financial data is analyzed. Market makers simultaneously announce their bid and ask prices for the period. , where y α t = 1 if she speculates, and is zero otherwise; e α γ,t = 1 if the agent investigates asset γ at date t, and is zero otherwise; x α γ,t = 1 if she buys one round lot of the asset, x α γ,t = −1 if she sells one round lot, and x α γ,t = 0 if she does not trade asset γ at time t. Agent α's strategy specifies her actions in each period of her life as functions of her belief about her skillfulness and information.
Market maker. A market maker's actions in each period consist of choosing a bid price for sell orders and an ask price for buy orders. A market maker's beliefs assign probabilities to the events that an incoming order originates from each possible source of trade-liquidity traders, young agents with different priors about ability, and old agents with different posteriors.
Equilibrium
We focus on stationary, symmetric Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green 1995) . Beliefs of agents along the equilibrium path are constructed using Bayes' rule, and their strategies are sequentially rational. Stationarity implies that all generations choose the same strategies, so that the distributions of endogenous variables do not vary over time. Because agents' decisions are independent conditional on the price quotes (which do not vary over time), agents solve a stochastic control problem. Given the optimal strategies of agents, market makers confront a one-shot, Bayesian game.
We first derive the conditions that a stationary and symmetric equilibrium must satisfy. We then solve a representative agent's optimization problem using dynamic programming methods:
We first solve an old agent's problem and then a young agent's problem; the two stages are linked by the agent's conditional probability of skillfulness based on her trading performance when young.
Lastly, we derive market makers' zero expected profit condition.
Lemma 1 In any stationary, symmetric PBE:
(1) All market makers who handle order flow expect zero profits from quoting bid and ask prices with the same mark-up in each period.
(2) Market makers' expected loss due to informed trade is the same across assets.
All proofs are in Appendix B. The idea is simple: If a market maker reduces ∆p below the level that already gave him zero profit, he only incurs losses, because he can not differentially attract uninformed trade. If ∆p is the same across assets, traders do not have an incentive to deviate from randomly investigating/trading assets with a uniform distribution. According to this lemma, market makers' strategies are uniquely identified by a mark-up ∆p over the publicly-known asset value component. Thus, the bid-ask spread of 2∆p is centered around assets' unconditional expected values. A natural way of supporting such an equilibrium is that all agents who investigate n assets (n arbitrary), investigate each asset with an equal probability n N . If the bid-ask spread never varies, speculators face the same optimization problem at each date. Hence, a stationary distribution of speculator actions is consistent with a best response to an invariant mark-up of ∆p. These features are central to our construction of the equilibrium.
The next lemma implies that there is no need to keep two sets of control variables, e α γ,t N γ=1
for investigating assets, and x α γ,t N γ=1 for trading assets.
Lemma 2 No speculator trades an asset that she has not investigated, i.e., there is no blind speculative (non-liquidity) trade in equilibrium. A speculator trades each asset that she investigates.
The proof is immediate: Trading an asset that is not investigated only imposes an expected loss due to the positive bid-ask spread. Further, because there is an opportunity cost to investigating an asset, it is not optimal to investigate an asset that is not traded.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that an agent's expected trading profit depends on the number of assets she trades, and not the specific assets in her portfolio. Hence, expected payoffs are easy to compute:
Lemma 3 The expected trading profit of an agent with belief ρ of skillfulness who trades n assets is
An agent's current-period expected payoff as a function of her work/speculate decision is:
Z ≡ z(2θ − 1) is an informed trader's information gain per asset.
In equation (3), Zρ − ∆p captures the expected profit (or loss) from trading one asset. The effective cost of an order is ∆p, and Zρ is the expected value of the trader's informational advantage.
Z ≡ z(2θ − 1) has two components: z is the magnitude of the shock to an asset's value, and (2θ − 1)
is the correlation between an informative signal and the random innovation to the asset's value. Z is the expected gain from being informed, and is adjusted by the probability of being informed, ρ. A trader who knows her signal is informative (ρ = 1), expects a profit from each trade of Z − ∆p. The agent's current-period expected payoff, equation (4), consists of two terms. The first is the income from working full time, i.e., when y = 0 . The second term is the expected payoff of a work-and-trade career. Here, w(1 − τ 0 − nτ ) is the income from work and n(Z − ∆p) is the expected trading profit.
The key dynamic feature of the model is an agent's updating of her probability, ρ, of skillfulness.
The next lemma details how an agent updates.
Lemma 4 If a trader's prior belief (prior probability of skillfulness) is ρ 0 , and she observes m correct trades among n trades, then her updated belief (posterior probability of skillfulness) ρ 1 is:
Old agents
An old agent chooses her actions to maximize her expected period payoff, solving max y 2 ,n 2
The old agent computes her optimal action using the updated probability of skillfulness, ρ 1 , which is computed based on her initial trading performance (hence the "1" subscript) according to Lemma 4.
An old agent's maximization problem (6) is straightforward: E 2 P 2 is linear in n 2 , with coefficient
If the expected trading profit exceeds the opportunity cost due to foregone work, then n 2 has a positive coefficient, and n * 2 =n, wheren is the maximum number of assets that the agent has time to investigate, (τ 0 +nτ ) ≤ 1 < (τ 0 + (n + 1)τ ). 3 Otherwise, the agent optimally works full-time. The following lemma summarizes this finding:
Lemma 5 An old agent either trades full-time, n * 2 =n, or works full-time, y * 2 = 0 .
The optimized expected payoff of an old agent is
That is, the agent's payoff corresponds to the income from full-time work plus the value of a call option written on the trade profit of an old agent, with a strike price of w. In particular, optimization implies a cut-off probability ρ c ≡ w/n+∆p Z , such that an old agent trades if ρ 1 > ρ c (∆p) , and works if ρ 1 ≤ ρ c (∆p) . Hence, an old agent's optimized expected payoff is
The critical probability ρ c is endogenous, as it depends on ∆p : The decision to speculate or not will depend on the bid-ask spread that market makers set. Fixing the distribution of ρ 1 , increasing ∆p reduces the number of young traders who continue to trade when old. 
Young agents
A young agent's decisions affect her current period payoffs and her future payoffs through the impact on her posterior, ρ 1 . The future effect is captured in the value function for an old agent, equation (8) . Taking expectations over future payoffs with respect to the first-period information yields:
E 1 V 2 (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) is the expected future value (optimized payoff) for a young trader with prior ρ who trades n 1 assets given ∆p. In equation (9), (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) is the probability the young trader continues to trade when old, and ξ(n 1 , ∆p, ρ) is the expected posterior probability (of skillfulness)
conditional on it being optimal to trade when old:
. (10) Given ∆p, let W 1 (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) be the expected lifetime payoff of a young trader with prior ρ who speculates and trades n 1 assets:
Given the ∆p set by market makers, a young agent chooses n 1 to maximize W 1 :
The "min" operator in the definition of n * 1 is simply a rule to select among possible maximizers.
A young agent with prior ρ has the option to work. It is easy to show that when the bid-ask spread is constant over time, an agent who finds it optimal to work full-time when young, also finds it optimal to work full-time when old. This is because her prior has not changed so that her expected profit from trade is unchanged. In addition, there is no value to learning when old. It follows that the payoff of an agent who optimally chooses not to work is
A young agent with prior ρ compares her expected lifetime payoff if she first speculates, W 1 (∆p, ρ), with her payoff of 2w from full-time work, testing her speculative abilities if and only if
We assume that an indifferent young agent with W 1 = W c always works. When the prior distribution does not have mass points, this assumption is without loss of generality, because this happens on a set of measure zero. The next lemma summarizes the key properties of the W 1 and W 1 functions:
Lemma 6 Suppose that informed agents can earn a positive rent, i.e., Z > w n . Then, 1. For n 1 ∈ {0, . . . ,n}, W 1 (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) is continuous in ∆p and ρ.
2. For n 1 ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, W 1 (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) is strictly increasing in ρ and strictly decreasing in ∆p.
3. For n 1 ∈ {0, . . . ,n} , if ∆p > Z − w n then W 1 (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) < 2w, and no agent trades. 4. W 1 (∆p , ρ) is jointly continuous, non-decreasing in ρ and non-increasing in ∆p .
Market maker
At the beginning of each period, market makers announce prices, v γ,t + ∆p for buy orders and v γ,t − ∆p for sell orders. In equilibrium, ∆p generates zero expected profits to market makers from both buy and sell orders. Because the trade game is zero-sum, a market maker's expected profit is the expected loss of all traders who trade with him.
Computing liquidity-traders' expected loss is easy. Their buy and sell orders are independent of end-of-period asset values. With probability one-half they earn a profit of z − ∆p , and with probability one-half they lose −z − ∆p. Hence, each liquidity trader expects to lose −∆p. As long as a positive measure of agents speculate, ∆p > 0, so that liquidity traders expect to lose money.
With expected liquidity trade of 2 µ N , the expected total market maker profit from liquidity trade is:
Now consider a representative agent with prior ρ. This agent trades when she is young if W 1 (∆p, ρ) > 2w and expects a profit (or loss) of n 1 (Zρ − ∆p) . Because trades are spread uniformly across assets, a market maker's expected profit from a young trader with prior ρ is:
If a young agent with prior ρ trades when young, then she continues to trade with probability (n * 1 , ∆p, ρ), where n * 1 = n * 1 (∆p, ρ) denotes her optimal choice of number of assets to investigate and trade when young. Her expected profit from trade, given that she remains a trader, is Zξ(n * 1 , ∆p, ρ) − ∆p . Because trades are spread uniformly across N assets, a market maker's expected profit from an old trader (who started) with prior ρ is:
To compute total expected market maker profit, we integrate expected profits over ρ,
The next lemma shows that this integral is well-defined.
Lemma 7
1. For a fixed ∆p, n * 1 (∆p, ρ) , (n * 1 (∆p, ρ), ∆p, ρ) , and ξ (n * 1 (∆p, ρ), ∆p, ρ) functions are Lebesguemeasurable in ρ, and {ρ | W 1 (∆p, ρ) > 2w} is a Lebesgue-measurable subset of ρ ∈ [0, 1] interval. Therefore, the integral in equation (17) is well-defined.
For a fixed ∆p, if there is a ρ
. That is, all young agents with priors ρ > ρ * trade. Hence, the zero expected profit condition for market makers is:
Equilibrium
Definition. A stationary, symmetric equilibrium is characterized by a collection, {n * 1 (·), ∆p * , ρ * }, where 1. Given ∆p * , a young agent with prior ρ who speculates chooses the number of trades n * 1 (ρ) to maximize expected lifetime profits, so that
2. Young agents optimally choose whether to enter financial markets or not: For ρ > ρ * , a young agent ρ speculates, and for ρ ≤ ρ * the young agent works, where
3. Market makers choose ∆p that earns zero expected profit:
That is, (1) young speculators choose their scope of trade to maximize expected lifetime income given the equilibrium bid-ask spread; (2) young agents who are more confident in their trading skills than ρ * trade, and all other young agents work full-time; (3) the bid-ask spread earns market makers zero expected profit given the optimal choices by agents. We next present a heuristic development of the equilibrium construction. This approach is then formalized in an existence theorem.
It is conceptually easier to separate the optimal participation choices by young agents from the zero expected profit condition for market makers. For a given ∆p, we introduce two marginal young agents: (1) the marginal young agent, ρ i , who is indifferent between work and trade, and (2) the marginal young agent, ρ z , such that market makers expect to break even given that all young agents with ρ > ρ z trade. In equilibrium, the two marginal young agents must coincide, i.e., ρ i = ρ z .
The indifferent marginal young agent, ρ i , is pinned down by
To define the zero-profit marginal young agent, we introduce a function,
. (21) M (∆p, ρ) is the expected profit of market makers given ∆p when young agents trade if and only if they are more likely than ρ to be able speculators. Equivalently, M (∆p, ρ) is the expected profit of market makers given the "belief" that young agents who are more confident than ρ trade. That is, ρ z (∆p) is the market maker "belief" that rationalizes their choice of ∆p:
In equilibrium, ∆p * ensures that the two marginal young agents coincide, so that both the second and the third conditions of equilibrium are satisfied:
That is, market makers' belief about agents' speculation choices are consistent with their choices.
Clearly, a unique equilibrium exists if ρ i (∆p) is increasing in ∆p and ρ z (∆p) is decreasing.
Lemma 6 proved that the expected lifetime utility of a young agent, W 1 , declines with ∆p and increases with ρ. This implies that youth speculation, ρ i (∆p), rises in ∆p. The argument required to prove that market maker profits rise with ∆p, i.e., ρ z (∆p) falls is more subtle. Essentially, we must show that young agents' trading intensities and hence expected trading profits fall with ∆p . This is not easy: For particular parameterizations, as ∆p rises, a given young agent may trade more intensively when young, in order to learn more about the profitability of trading when old.
Conversely, it may be that as ∆p rises, an agent trades less when young, but is more likely to speculate when old. Hence, tight results do not obtain if we look at an agent at each stage of her life. The trick is to look at total expected lifetime outcomes:
Proposition 1 For an agent with prior ρ who speculates, an increase in ∆p reduces weakly her expected number of lifetime trades, η ≡ n 1 +n , and reduces strictly her lifetime trading profits, L ≡ n 1 (Zρ−∆p)+n (Zξ −∆p) . Hence, an increase in ∆p strictly raises expected market maker profits.
Note that in our stationary setting, expected total period trading losses of market makers to speculators (integrating over young and old speculators) also equal the losses that the market makers expect from trading with the current generation of young speculators over their entire career. That is, Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium construction. It shows an out-of-equilibrium value of ∆p 0 , for which the indifferent marginal young agent is lower than the zero-profit marginal young agent,
i.e., ρ i,0 < ρ z,0 . Because all young agents with priors larger than ρ i,0 trade, the expected profit for market makers is negative, as inspection of the M function reveals. To reach an equilibrium, ∆p must be raised. This does two things. First, it makes trading less profitable for young agents, which causes some less confident young traders, who previously entered financial markets (and who expected positive lifetime trading profits) to quit trading. That is, W 1 shifts to the right, and consequently so does ρ i . Second, increasing ∆p raises the expected profits that market makers earn from each trader. That is, M shifts to the left, and hence so does ρ z . It is immediate that the process must result in a (unique) equilibrium in which the two marginal investors coincide, ρ i = ρ z .
Theorem 1 (Existence.) Let the distribution of priors, F , have a density, f , which is positive on Z is an informed agent (ρ = 1) information gain per asset and w n is the opportunity cost of trading one asset for a full-time trader. If Z ≤ w n there is no incentive to trade and all agents work full time. The economically relevant case is where Z > w n so that an agent who knows he is informed earns a positive information rent, and hence some agents trade in equilibrium.
The proof follows the heuristic existence argument described above. The assumption that F has support [0, 1] has no economic importance and serves only to simplify the existence condition and proofs. This proof does use the assumption that the distribution of priors has no mass points; that is, F is absolutely continuous (with respect to the Lebesgue measure) and has a density f . One can prove that an equilibrium exists if F has mass points, but it takes more work to establish the requisite continuity properties. We develop this in section 3.1 for the special case of homogenous priors in which F is degenerate at a prior ρ 0 . The proof of existence for a general distribution of priors essentially melds the analyses for the two cases.
Equilibrium Characterization
We next document the key qualitative features of the equilibrium. Figure 1 provides the central intuition. Take an equilibrium ∆p * and marginal young investor ρ * , and consider parameter changes that either shift the zero-profit marginal investor, ρ z , to the right, or shift the indifferent marginal investor, ρ i , to the left, or do both (changes in the opposite directions are handled similarly). After such changes, the zero-profit marginal investor, ρ z , exceeds the indifferent marginal investor, ρ i . As a result, given ∆p * , market makers expect losses. From Proposition 1, to reach a new equilibrium, market makers set ∆p * * > ∆p * , and from Lemma 6, raising ∆p reduces ρ i .
The next proposition develops the key comparative statics for a fixed ∆p * . The above argument is then used to derive the consequences for equilibrium when ∆p * responds endogenously to the parameter changes. The seeming obviousness of the comparative statics conceals subtleties.
Specifically, it is easy to derive the effects of parameter changes on the work/speculation decisions by young and old agents, and to derive the consequences for market maker profits fixing trading intensity decisions. What is difficult is establishing the consequences for market maker profits of changes in trading intensities induced by parameter changes. In particular, we must sign the impact for all parameter values. The key is again that market maker profits are reduced if expected trading intensities rise. In the proposition, we use ∆(·) to denote change, η = n 1 +n is the expected lifetime trade intensity, and L(n 1 , ρ, ∆p) denotes the expected market makers' lifetime loss to agent
Proposition 2 If the fixed time costs of speculation, τ 0 , are sufficiently small, then the effects of increasing {µ, w, z, ρ} are as follows:
2) wage/opportunity cost:
3) Trade profitability:
4) Ability of young trader:
We now use the results in Proposition 2, to derive the comparative static properties of equilibrium outcomes. The following are immediate corollaries of Proposition 2.
Reducing exogenous liquidity trade, µ, increases the equilibrium bid-ask spread ∆p * , and raises ρ * , decreasing the equilibrium measure of young speculators, 1 ρ * dF (ρ). Decreasing µ reduces expected market maker profit (M shifts to the right). To compensate, market makers raise ∆p, which reduces the payoff to speculation by the young (W 1 shifts to the right) and raises expected market maker profit (M shifts to the left). In equilibrium, the "new" marginal investor is more likely to be able than the old one, ρ * * > ρ * , i.e., there are fewer young speculators.
Reducing the opportunity costs of trading, w, increases both the equilibrium bid-ask spread and the measure of young speculators.
Decreasing w reduces the opportunity cost of trading, lowering the payoff from work by more than the expected lifetime payoff from testing speculation when young. This shifts the marginal indifferent investor, ρ i , to the left so that market makers must raise the bid-ask spread to break even. Raising ∆p shifts W 1 right and shifts M left. In equilibrium, the new marginal investor is less likely to be able, ρ * * < ρ * ; i.e., more young agents speculate. Hence, the percentage of young speculators who lose money rises.
Increasing trade profitability, z, raises the equilibrium bid-ask spread. The effect on the equilibrium measure of young speculators is ambiguous.
Increasing z raises the profitability of trading on information. Hence, the expected gains to speculation, W 1 , rise and expected market maker profit, M , falls: ρ i shifts to the left and ρ z shifts to the right. To compensate, market makers raise ∆p, which shifts W 1 to the right and shifts M to the left. The impact on the measure of young agents who speculate is ambiguous: ρ * * ρ * .
If agents are more likely to be able speculators-a first order stochastic improvement in F -then the equilibrium bid-ask spread widens. The effect on the measure of young speculators is ambiguous.
A first order stochastic improvement in F reduces expected market maker profit. The chain of events is similar to that for a reduction in exogenous liquidity. Accordingly, ∆p * * > ∆p * and ρ * * > ρ * . The effect on the measure of young agents who speculate is ambiguous because the distribution itself has shifted to the right.
If agents have more diverse priors (a second order stochastic shift of F around the marginal investor ρ * ) then the equilibrium bid-ask spread widens and equilibrium measure of young speculators falls.
Spreading the distribution of investor abilities around ρ * reduces expected market maker profit for a fixed ∆p because those agents who speculate are more likely to be able. The chain of events is similar to a reduction in the exogenous liquidity, and hence ∆p * * > ∆p * and ρ * * > ρ * . The shift in F , reinforced by ρ * * > ρ * imply that there are fewer young speculators.
Extreme Cases: Full information and Homogenous Priors
We now study equilibrium outcomes for the two extreme formulations of the distribution of priors:
• Young agents know if they are skilled. With "full-information", there is no learning from trade.
• All young agents have the same prior and no pre-trade learning occurs. With "homogenous priors", all learning is through trade.
Full information. In a full-information economy, each agent knows whether or not she is able.
The distribution of priors across agents has two mass points: f (0) is the measure of unskilled agents and f (1) is the measure of skilled agents. In equilibrium, agents speculate only if they are skilled.
Let ι 1 denote the measure of young agents who enter financial markets. With heterogenous priors, this measure is endogenously determined by ι * 1 = 1 ρ * dF (ρ) , where ρ * is the indifferent young agent. With full-information, ι 1 is tightly connected to the measure of skilled young agents, f (1).
A skilled agent who speculates does so full-time, i.e., n =n. Hence, the maximized period payoff of a skilled agent is
All skilled agents enter financial markets if Z > ∆p + w n , and if Z = ∆p + w n , at least some skilled agents speculate. A necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium with speculation to exist is that Z > w n . This is the same "positive rent" condition that we had in Theorem 1: wages are not so high that an agent who knows that he is informed does better to work than to speculate.
The expected profit of market makers is:
and the zero expected profit condition for market makers implies that
From equation ( 
Homogenous priors. With homogenous priors, all young agents start with the same prior, ρ 0 . If some, but not all, young agents speculate, then young agents must be indifferent between testing their speculative abilities and work, so that W 1 (∆p) = 2w. Let ι 1 be the fraction of young agents who speculate (or the probability that a young agent speculates). If old agents with the same posterior make the same decisions (generically, there is a unique optimal action), then the zero expected profit condition for market makers is
Because young agents start with the same prior, market makers expected profit is linear in the measure of young agents who participate in financial markets. Given a ∆p, the measure of young agents who speculate is pinned down by the zero expected profit condition:
To find an equilibrium, first assume that only some young agents engage in speculation. Then indifference of young agents to speculation implies that ∆p * is pinned down by the solution to
For this ∆p * , we solve equation (30) to find the measure of young speculators, ι * 1 , that gives market makers zero expected profit. This yields the unique equilibrium.
There are two caveats to this characterization. First, it is possible that even when ∆p = 0, the expected lifetime payoff from trade, W 1 , is less than the payoff from work, 2w. This happens if and only if the prior information gain, Zρ 0 , is less than the per asset opportunity cost, w n . In such cases, ∆p = 0 and no one speculates in equilibrium. However, as long as w is sufficiently small, some agents speculate in equilibrium. Second, it may be that even when every young agent speculates, market makers expect a positive profit at the bid-ask spread that leaves young agents indifferent between trade and work. Because expected market maker profit falls in ∆p, equilibrium demands that ∆p be reduced, which implies that all young agents strictly prefer to speculate. What complicates matters in this case is that as we reduce ∆p, the number of assets that a young agent optimally investigates can jump: to smooth market maker payoffs, one then has to consider a distribution over the number of assets each young agent investigates. Mahani (2004) provides a detailed analysis of this case.
Matching Empirical Observations
We next show that for reasonable parameter choices, the model's equilibrium features the empirical regularities previously highlighted:
2. Large (more active) speculators show better performance than small (less active) speculators.
3. Performance positively affects the subsequent trade intensity. Specially, a significant portion of new traders (who start on a small scale and show very poor performance) cease speculation after a short period of time.
4. Performance shows persistence.
For simplicity, we produce the empirical regularities using homogenous priors. Table 1 presents representative parameterizations for which the model produces all empirical regularities. The first five columns show model parameters. The level of exogenous liquidity trade, µ, is adjusted in all cases to produce an equilibrium young participation rate of 0.01. We normalize the outside wage w to one and set τ 0 = 0.001. 5 The next five columns detail the equilibrium values of endogenous variables. They show that the model matches the key empirical observations. The ratio of young to old trading intensities, n * 1 n , is less than 0.2 in all cases: Trading intensities rise at least five-fold with experience. The expected profit of a young trader, EΠ Y , is negative and small: inexperienced traders make small average losses. The average profits of old traders, EΠ O , is positive and greater than two: experienced traders make considerable profits, which implies that profits are positively correlated with experience, and that performance is persistent. Finally, there is a very high exit rate, 1 − , of inexperienced traders. Table 2 shows the probability of a successful trade and the probability of losing money for each group of young and old traders and for the two groups combined. These numbers are all computed for the configurations studied in Table 1 , i.e., the first five columns are the same in the two tables.
The last three columns indicate that we match the empirical observation that about two-thirds to three-quarters of individual speculators lose money. Table 3 reveals the effect of learning-from-trade on financial markets. The first five columns are exactly the same as Table 1 , and the last column shows the ratio of endogenous-to-exogenous liquidity in equilibrium. An environment with learning affords more informed trading than a fullinformation setting in which each agent knows whether she is a skilled speculator. An important question is: Which source of liquidity dominates? This numerical investigation shows that the answer depends on the parameters of the economy: To answer the question for a particular financial market, one must calibrate the model with market data. Table 3 suggests that learning-from-trade is a key endogenous source of liquidity. We now investigate this and related aspects of learning-from-trade. To do so, we contrast outcomes when agents share a common prior with those when agents know whether they are skilled. A useful interpretation is that the prior distribution quantifies the amount of pre-trade learning (for example, through education or paper trading) in the economy. In a full-information economy, all learning takes place before trade, whereas in an economy with homogenous prior all learning occurs via trading.
Qualitative Effects of Learning-from-trade
Consider an equilibrium of the reference model with heterogenous priors, which is characterized by (∆p * , ρ * , n * 1 (·)). The model approaches full-information as probability mass is transferred toward the two end points of the distribution. Our comparative static analyses reveal that this process raises the equilibrium bid-ask spread and reduces the equilibrium measure of inexperienced 5 If τ0 is too large, young speculators must expect to make money-to cover the fixed time costs of speculation.
speculators. Conversely, moving the probability mass in the prior distribution inward yields the homogenous-prior in the limit. This reduces the equilibrium bid-ask spread and leads to more speculation by young traders. Moreover, with full-information, any agent who trades when young, trades when old, whereas if young agents have homogenous priors, many young traders lose money and cease trading. Summarizing these facts reveals that
• Learning-from-trade serves to reduce the bid-ask spread and to raise the rate of entry and exit in financial markets.
• Pre-trade learning increases the bid-ask spread and reduces entry and exit in financial markets.
This analysis confirms that learning-from-trade acts as an endogenous source of liquidity in financial markets. Recall that increasing exogenous liquidity reduces the bid-ask spread and raises speculation by young agents. In this sense, less diversified priors, which amount to more learningfrom-trade, are qualitatively similar to adding exogenous liquidity.
We next explore the effect of learning-from-trade on the economy's reaction to perturbations in the underlying parameters by contrasting the comparative statics properties of the three models (full-information, homogenous priors, and the reference heterogenous priors model). To make this comparison, we need comparable equilibria across the three models. Hence, we repeat the process of moving distribution mass in (toward homogenous priors) and out (toward full-information), with one difference: We offset each change in the variance of the distribution with a shift of distribution that leaves the equilibrium marginal investor, and hence the equilibrium bid-ask spread, unchanged (see Figure 2 ). More specifically, when moving the distribution mass out (toward full-information) we shift the distribution to the left; and when moving the distribution mass in (toward homogenous priors) we shift the distribution to the right. 6 By construction, the resulting equilibria have the same bid-ask spread and the same marginal investor, but more inexperienced agents speculate in the homogenous priors model than in the reference model than in the full-information model. That is, to match an observed average bid-ask spread in real markets, in economies with less diverse beliefs, more participation by novice traders is needed. This is another way of saying that when agents have more homogenous priors, there is more learning-from-trade, and more endogenous liquidity is provided.
Learning-from-trade reduces the effects of exogenous liquidity shocks on the equilibrium bid-ask spread, but raises their effects on the equilibrium rate of entry in financial markets.
Consider a reduction in exogenous liquidity, µ. This reduces expected market maker profits, M , but does not affect W 1 . In the reference heterogenous priors model, reducing µ increases the bid-ask spread and reduces participation by young agents. In contrast, if agents are fully informed, then as long as agents trade if and only if they are able, the increase in µ is completely absorbed in ∆p, and we see a larger (increasing) effect on ∆p than in the reference model. In contrast, with homogenous priors, if some, but not all, young agents speculate, ∆p is pinned down by the indifference condition for the young agents (i.e., ∆p leaves young agents indifferent between trade and work). Therefore, increases in µ are completely absorbed by greater reductions in speculation by young agents than in the reference model.
Learning-from-trade raises the effects of changes in trading costs on both the equilibrium bid-ask spread and the rate of entry in financial markets.
Consider a reduction in trading costs, w. This shifts the marginal indifferent investor, ρ i , to the left, but does not affect the expected market maker profit, M . In the reference model, such a change raises ∆p. In contrast, if agents are fully informed and trade if and only if they are able, young participation is unchanged so that market maker profits remain unchanged, and hence ∆p does not change. Hence, with full information, reducing trading costs has no effect on either ∆p or young participation. However, with homogenous priors, ∆p must increase by enough to leave young agents indifferent between trade and work. Moreover, speculation by young agents must rise to drive market maker profits back down to zero with the wider spread. This contrasts with the reference model, where the zero-profit marginal investor, ρ z , shifts to the left. Thus, in the reference model the new equilibrium features a less able marginal investor. This feedback effect is missing when agents have homogenous priors, which implies that the increases in the bid-ask spread and young participation are greater than in the reference model.
Overconfidence
We have assumed that speculators are rational, and demonstrated that learning through trade induces behaviors related to those attributed to overconfidence. However, our model offers a natural environment in which to analyze overconfidence. To whit, suppose that a fraction r(ρ) ∈ (0, 1) of agents with prior ρ incorrectly perceive their probability of skillfulness to beρ = ρ + dρ, where dρ is positive, but small. Further suppose that market makers are fully rational: Market makers recognize the presence of overconfident speculators, understand how overconfidence affects decisionmaking, and form expectations based on the actual probabilities.
One's intuition might be that overconfident traders should earn lower trading profits, ceteris paribus raising market makers' expected profits, and hence reducing equilibrium bid-ask spreads; and therefore ultimately be welfare improving for rational traders (just as an increase in liquidity trade is). This intuition is wrong:
Proposition 3 The presence of slightly overconfident speculators raises equilibrium bid-ask spreads, hurting all traders.
The full support assumption for overconfident speculators (r(ρ) ∈ (0, 1), ∀ρ) ensures that there is a positive measure of overconfident speculators with "true" prior ρ, but perceived priorρ = ρ+dρ, whose trading strategies differ from their "rational" counterparts. Because this alternative choice was feasible for a rational agent, it follows immediately that the expected lifetime utility of an overconfident speculator is lower than her rational counterpart. More importantly, Proposition 2 implies that those overconfident speculators whose trading strategies differ from those of their rational counterparts expect to trade more over their lifetime. The key is that if speculators are only marginally overconfident, their expected marginal trading profits on their "excessive trades" are close to their opportunity costs of the value of their work time foregone, implying that they expect to earn positive profits on their excessive trading, just not quite enough to cover their opportunity costs. In turn, this implies that in equilibrium, market makers must quote wider bid-ask spreads, hurting all traders.
Conclusion
This paper introduces learning-from-trade to financial speculation to explain several empirical regularities within a consistent framework. Inexperienced traders begin speculation on a small scale, trading off expected losses against the value of information generated by greater trading. Necessarily, a portion of inexperienced traders leave financial markets with losses when they update to conclude that they are unlikely to be skilled, while survivors expand their trades and make more profits. Learning produces the aggressive trading behavior that is traditionally attributed to psychological biases such as overconfidence.
Our fully-equilibrium model permits us to derive the effects of changes in parameters of the economy on the entry, exit and performance of financial speculators. Our model also provides insight into the interaction between learning-from-trade and other elements of financial markets.
It confirms the intuition that small speculators provide liquidity to financial markets, and indeed endogenizes this speculative liquidity. It shows both that learning-from-trade reduces the effects of exogenous liquidity shocks on financial markets by absorbing them into the entry and exit of small speculators, and that learning-from trade opens a new channel through which shocks on the real side of the economy can affect financial markets.
Were we to extend the model so that agents had longer trading horizons, and were risk averse, then we would find that average trading intensities would rise with experience, as would persistence in performance, and expected trading profits. This just reflects that learning would continue over time, and that agents with past trading profits correctly believe that they are more likely to be able, and they would expand their trades as a consequence.
Further extensions of our model may explain other anomalies. Introducing correlation across agents' learning processes can drive fluctuations in speculative intensities with corresponding impacts on volume and bid-ask spreads. It also seems worthwhile to connect this model with the literature on "commonality in liquidity" to explain common liquidity movements across assets. Finally, it would be valuable to extend our model to compute welfare measures. Ironically, many regulations in the financial markets are designed to affect (either limit or enhance) public speculation, without a rigorous understanding of their ultimate welfare effects. This table shows the equilibrium quantities from homogenous prior models for different parameters. In all cases, w = 1 and τ 0 = 0.001 and µ is adjusted so that a young participation rate of 0.01 emerges in equilibrium. EΠ Y , the average profit of young speculators, is:
EΠ O , the average profit of old speculators, is:
1 − is the probability a young speculator ceases trading when old. This table shows the probability of a successful trade and the probability of making losses (in overall trades) with homogenous priors and different sets of parameters. In all cases, w = 1 and τ 0 = 0.001 and µ is adjusted so that a young participation rate of 0.01 is obtained in the equilibrium. The following definitions are used: This table shows the ratio of endogenous liquidity to exogenous liquidity for homogenous prior models with different sets of parameters. In all cases, w = 1 and τ 0 = 0.001 and µ is adjusted so that a young participation rate of 0.01 is obtained in the equilibrium. Exogenous liquidity is 2µ∆p . Endogenous liquidity is the expected total trading losses of young and old agents who are in fact unskilled. To quantify the endogenous liquidity, We compute the ratio of unskilled traders among young and old agents and their losses. For young agents, this gives: ι 1 n 1 (1 − ρ 0 )∆p . For old agents, we sum over different possibilities in the first period: 
Model Parameters
Agents expected payoff from trade market makers' expected profit
Figure 1: Construction of an Equilibrium in the Model with Heterogenous Priors
Equilibrium is defined as the equality of two marginal young agents: (1) the marginal young agent ρ i (∆p) who is indifferent between work and trade W 1 (ρ i , ∆p) = 2w, and (2) the marginal young agent ρ z (∆p) who gives market makers zero expected profit, if all young agent above her (i.e., more confident with higher ρ's) trade: M (ρ z , ∆p) = 0. The first situation depicted in this graph (dashed lines) is when ρ i,0 < ρ z,0 . In this case, market makers have negative expected profit and the economy is out of equilibrium. To reach the equilibrium bid-ask spread, ∆p must increase until ρ i = ρ z = ρ * . Two extreme models are obtained from the reference model with heterogenous priors (when f > 0 on (0, 1) interval) by changing the variance of the priors and keeping the original equilibrium (via shifting distribution mass). Increasing the variance is equivalent to increasing the amount of pre-trade learning and in the limit gives the "full-information" model (the limit case of M F in this graph). Decreasing the variance in the limit gives the "homogenous prior" model (the limit case of M H in this graph). Reducing the variance in general makes the market makers' profit function steeper around the equilibrium point.
A Empirical studies on speculators' performance Ross (1973, 1975) : This study is based on records of customers of a large commodity-trading house. Of the 2283 accounts between 1971 and 1972 that are identified as speculative public accounts, there are 1644 losers and 639 winners with after-commission losses of $7,524,225 (profit of $2,303,273). The commissions are about $8,000,000 and hence a net before-commission profit of about $2,800,000 for the speculating public. The study also followed 380 accounts for five years or until account termination (whichever comes first). It found that (i) about 51% of the accounts were active for one year or less; (ii) the intensity of trading increased with the duration of trading;
and (iii) the relation between the duration of trade and traders' performance was monotonically increasing when accounts were grouped based on the first year capital.
Hartzmark (1987, 1991) : The data come from the CFTC permanent files on nine markets from 2. There is a clean monotonic relation between past profitability and subsequent performance. The most profitable traders continue to earn superior net (after commission) profits, while the least profitable traders continue to suffer gross (before commission) losses.
3. About 80 percent of traders on a semi-annual period lose money.
4. There is a strong relation between performance and subsequent day-trading activity within each (past six months day-trade intensity) partition. The average investor in the top (bottom) performing group increase (decrease) day trading activity.
5. The gross profits earned by heavy day traders come primarily from the execution of aggressive orders: heavy day traders are not profiting primarily from providing liquidity. Instead, they are able to forecast short-term trends in prices.
In addition, Hadady (2000) 
B Proofs of Results
Proof of Lemma 1.
(1) We first show that a market maker cannot use a mark-up other than the one that earns him zero expected profit in a symmetric PBE. When at least two market makers compete for orders, no market maker can profit from setting a wider quote, as he will lose all orders. The sole question is whether a market maker can profit from slightly reducing ∆p. Clearly this would happen if the 'original' ∆p produces positive profits for market makers, so suppose ∆p earns a market maker zero expected profits. In such a case, we show that deviating to a lower ∆p cannot lead to profits:
Profits would be possible only if reducing ∆p attracts more uninformed (young and noise) trades than informed (old) trades. But, agents choose which assets to investigate prior to seeing prices, and all agents who trade the asset, trade with the market maker with smallest ∆p. But this leaves the proportions of the informed and uninformed trading the same. Hence, the market maker must incur a small loss from reducing ∆p below the level that earns zero profits. Finally, stationarity assumption implies that the common mark-up should not change with time.
(2) If market makers' expected loss is not uniform across asset then the zero-profit mark-up won't be the same across assets, which cannot happen in a stationary, symmetric PBE by part (1).
Finally, we note that if traders choose the assets to investigate with a uniform probability, then expected losses will be uniform across assets.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let Π denote the profit from trade, and P denote the total payoff from trade-work combination. It is immediate that
When x j and Z j have the same sign, i.e. x j Z j = z, the agent trades in the "right" direction and her profit is z − ∆p. When x j Z j = −z, the agent trades in the "wrong" direction and her loss is −z − ∆p. The realized profit of a trader who has m correct trades out of n total trades is
We next compute an agent's expected trade profit,
The random variable m is the number of successes in a binomial experiment of size n, when the probability of success is θ. The probability of Z j = z is 1 2 . Clearly, it is optimal for a trader to follow her signal (buy when signal is one, sell otherwise). Hence,
Therefore, E[m | θ] = nθ. If ρ is the probability of having an informative source of signal, then θ takes the value ofθ with probability ρ and the value of 1 2 with probability 1 − ρ. It follows that:
The current period expected trading profit is:
which exhibits constant returns to scale in the number of assets traded n.
Proof of Lemma 4.
The general problem can be described as a Bernoulli experiment with probability of success θ, which is repeated N times independently with m successes. Probability θ is a random variable with two possible values ofθ and 1 2 and the prior probability of θ =θ is ρ. The updated (posterior) probability of θ =θ is computed via Bayes rule:
Substituting for the probabilities in the above expression gives us:
Simplifying this expression gives Equation(5).
Proof of Lemma 5 An old agent's expected payoff is: Proof of Lemma 6.
Step 1. The possible points of discontinuity are (∆p 0 , ρ 0 ) such that ρ c (∆p 0 ) ≡ w/n+∆p 0 Z lies on a mass point of the discrete distribution of ρ 1 (n 1 , ρ 0 ) and hence 0 < 0 (n 1 , ∆p 0 , ρ 0 ) ≡ Pr{ρ 1 (n 1 , ρ 0 ) = ρ c (∆p 0 )}. Noting the direction of the inequality in (n 1 , ∆p,
. Therefore:
and similarly W 1 (n 1 , ∆p 0 , ρ 0 ) = W 1 (n 1 , ∆p 0 , ρ 0 +). Hence W 1 is continuous at (∆p 0 , ρ 0 ).
Step 2. Fixing n 1 ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, W 1 is continuously differentiable in both arguments everywhere except at the points
Hence, W 1 is strictly decreasing in ∆p and strictly increasing in ρ (for n 1 > 0).
Step 3. Because ρ 1 ≤ 1 , ∆p > Z − w n implies ≡ 0 , and therefore
n , and simple algebra shows that W 1 < 2w.
Step 4. Both properties of W 1 (∆p, ρ) are immediate because it is the maximum of finite number of functions with the same properties.
Proof of Lemma 7.
Step 1. n * 1 can take finitely many values. The set of (∆p, ρ)'s such that n * 1 = k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,n} is identified by a collection of inequalities, and so is measurable. Hence, n * 1 is measurable in (∆p, ρ). (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) and ξ(n 1 , ∆p, ρ) are measurable in (n 1 , ∆p, ρ) by definition. Measurability of n * 1 implies that (n * 1 (∆p, ρ), ∆p, ρ) and ξ(n * 1 (∆p, ρ), ∆p, ρ) are measurable in (∆p, ρ).
Step 2. For a fixed ∆p, if W c > 2w ⇒ ρ > ρ c , and now we show that n * 1 =n and W 1 (∆p, ρ) = W 1 (n, ∆p, ρ) > W c (∆p, ρ). First, consider two parts of W 1 , the current expected payoff E 1 [P 1 | y 1 = 1] and the future expected payoff E 1 [V 2 | y 1 = 0], separately. The future expected payoff is nondecreasing in n 1 : it is always possible to disregard the additional information obtained by more testing (i.e. increasing n 1 ), so that increasing n 1 cannot reduce expected payoffs. Moreover, ρ > ρ c implies that the current expected payoff is increasing in n 1 . As a results W (n 1 , ∆p) will be increasing in n 1 and the optimal n 1 will be n * 1 ≡n.
Second, to show that W 1 (n, ∆p, ρ) > W c (∆p, ρ) when ρ > ρ c , again consider two parts of the W 1 separately. The current expected profit,n(Zρ − ∆p), exceeds w by the definition of ρ c . If we show that the future expected payoff,
(from last paragraph). It is easy to see (n 1 , ∆p, ρ)| n 1 =0 = χ {ρ>ρc} and ξ(n 1 , ∆p, ρ) (n 1 , ∆p, ρ)| n 1 =0 = ρχ {ρ>ρc} and hence when ρ > ρ c , E[V 2 | y 1 = 1]
Step 3. This is trivial from part 2, and the fact that W 1 is strictly increasing in ρ in the neighborhood of W 1 = 2w. In that neighborhood, n * 1 > 0 (otherwise, W 1 = 2w − wτ 0 ) and therefore, by part 2 of Lemma 6 in section 2.2, W 1 ≡ W 1 (n * 1 ) is strictly increasing.
Proof of Proposition 1. Denote the expected lifetime losses of market makers to a young agent with prior ρ who trades n 1 assets (when young) given ∆p by L(n 1 , ∆p, ρ),
which equal the expected liftetime trading profits of the young speculator ρ.
(1) If an agent's trading decisions are unaffected, then
(2) If n 1 is not affected by the increase in ∆p, but the decision to speculate when old is, then because the increase in ∆p reduces expected profits from speculation when old, it follows that the increase in ∆p causes the speculator to require m * + 1 successes to speculate rather than m * . The speculator must have been indifferent to speculation and not, implying that his expected trading profits following m * successes were w, so that the market maker's expected losses fall discontinuously by the probability of m * successes times w. (Equivalently, equation 38 and continuity of W 1 implies that jump in L with a marginal increase in ∆p is −w 0 , where 0 ≡ Pr{ρ 1 = ρ c }. Also see proof of Lemma 6.) (3) When choice of n 1 is affected by an increase in ∆p, then (at least) two choices of trades when young must leave the agent indifferent, i.e., W 1 (n 1 ) = W 1 (n 1 ), for somen 1 ,n 1 . Assume for simplicity that the participation decision (when old) does not change (this eases presentation-and for a generic set of parameters, ρ is not indifferent between trades n 1 andn 1 when young, and indifferent between participation and not when old). Then, equations (38) and (39) imply that the marginal changes in W 1 are −(n 1 +n˘ ) and −(n 1 +nˆ ) where˘ andˆ are computed fromn 1 andn 1 , respectively. The marginal reduction is greater when expected trades, n 1 +n , are higher, implying that the increase in ∆p causes ρ to reduce expected trading when young. Then equation (38) and the factn 1 andn 1 must generate the same payoff of W 1 imply thatL <L , i.e., market makers' expected losses are lowered by the reduced trading intensity.
Proof of Theorem 1. We provide the proof in a series of straightforward steps:
Step 1 
This function is well-defined: When ρ = ρ, D i (ρ 0 ) = 0 from part 1, and since W 1 is continuous in both arguments, non-decreasing in ρ, and non-increasing in ∆p, for ρ 0 > ρ there always exists a ∆p 0 such that W 1 (∆p 0 , ρ 0 ) = 2w. This ∆p 0 is unique: W 1 is strictly increasing in ρ and strictly decreasing in ∆p in a neighborhood of (∆p 0 , ρ 0 ) (from part 2 of Lemma 6).
Step 3. D i (ρ) is continuous and increasing. This is immediate from the fact that W 1 is jointly continuous, strictly increasing in ρ and strictly decreasing in ∆p in a neighborhood of (∆p 0 = D i (ρ 0 ), ρ 0 ). Step 5. Hence, there is a unique ∆p * such that M(∆p * ) = 0 (the equilibrium mark-up).
Next, we present and prove a lemma used in the above proof. To state the lemma, we define a
The function is well-defined because D i is increasing in ρ. This lemma confirms our graphical construction of equilibrium: It shows that M is increasing in ρ for the relevant range of priors.
Lemma 8 . Let:
(
Proof.
(1) The partial derivative of M with respect to ρ is defined almost everywhere, and it equals
In the above expression the dependence of n * 1 , , and ξ functions on ρ 0 and ∆p 0 are omitted and all functions are evaluated at (∆p 0 , ρ 0 ). Clearly, ∂M ∂ρ is positive in a neighborhood of . For an agent who is indifferent between two trades, n 1 and n 1 , the second part can be written in terms of the first part, and we directly obtain:
Lemma 11 If agent ρ is indifferent between n 1 and n 1 , i.e., W 1 = W 1 , then:
Therefore, starting from an indifference situation, for changes in certain parameters we can identify the difference between slopes of two payoff functions with the expected trade intensity and hence specify the effect of changes in those parameters on expected trade intensity:
Lemma 12 Consider an agent who is indifferent between n 1 and n 1 , then:
2) ∂W 1 /∂w − ∂W 1 /∂w = −( η − η)/n 3) ∂W 1 /∂z − ∂W 1 /∂z = ∆p+w/n z ( η − η) 4) ∂W 1 /∂ρ − ∂W 1 /∂ρ = (Z − ∆p − w/n)(∆p + w/n) Zρ(1 − ρ)
Proof. In all cases we focus on the case that the old participation decision is not discontinuously affected by the change in parameter. (In case of ρ, however, we consider continuous changes in .)
1)
∂W 1 ∂∆p = −η > 0 , and the result is immediate. 2) ∂W 1 ∂w = 2 − η/n > 0 (note that 0 < η/n < 2 ) , and the result is immediate. 
= W 1 + w n (n 1 +n )
and therefore if agent is indifferent betweenn 1 andη then:
Therefore, we can sign the direction of changes in market makers losses, which is caused by an increase in either one of the four parameters, {∆p, w, z, ρ}, through the possible change in trade intensity n 1 . Combining this result with the normal infinitesimal analysis of changes in market makers losses caused by changes in parameters give part C of the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. An agent with with perceived prior ρ+dρ uses the same decision rule as one with true prior ρ+dρ. From Proposition 2, an agent with prior ρ+dρ expects to make at least as many trades over his lifetime as an agent with prior ρ. Further, the premise of Proposition 3 implies that agents with sufficiently higher priors expect to trade strictly more than those with lower priors.
Because r(ρ) > 0 for all ρ ∈ [0, 1], it then follows that a positive measure of overconfident agents expect to trade more over their lifetime than their rational counterparts. For any such pair (ρ, ρ + dρ), let ∆η(ρ, ρ + dρ) be the associated difference in expected trading intensities, with associated expected reduction in earnings from work for the overconfident speculator of wτ ∆η(ρ, ρ + dρ). By continuity, there exists a dρ * (ρ) > 0 such that for all dρ < dρ * (ρ), the expected lifetime utility of overconfident speculator ρ + dρ is within wτ ∆η(ρ, ρ + dρ) of his rational counterpart's. In turn, this implies that his expected lifetime trading profits strictly exceed his rational counterpart's. But then expected market maker profits are reduced by the presence of overconfident speculators. To restore zero expected market maker profits, bid-ask spreads must widen.
